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REGULATION OF CORPORATE FINANCE AND MAN-
AGEMENT UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 *
T HE most dynamic legislation of the New Deal affecting cor-
porations may very well be the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935.' Quite apart from its program of economic
planning in which the " death sentence " provisions play so promi-
nent a part, the Act provides a basis for realigning the legal prin-
ciples of corporate practice. Already the SEC has interpreted
both the letter and spirit of the Act so as to impose standards which
proceed far beyond the principle of disclosure. Though confined
in their application to the public utility industry, these standards
have wider significance, for ultimately they may be applied to all
corporate finance and management should proposed legislation be
adopted.2
The broad objective of the Act is to protect investors, consum-
ers and the public in general from certain abusive practices in
corporate finance and management. These practices were re-
* This article is based exclusively upon information derived from the published
releases of the SEC up to and including Holding Company Act Release No. 1301,
November 2, 1938. Nothing herein may properly be taken as an expression of opin-
ion of the Commission or any of its officials.
3 49 STAT. 803 (1935), i5 UT. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1937), hereafter referred to sim-
ply as " the Act" unless the full title is necessary for clarity.
2 Several bills introduced in the 75th Congress afford opportunities for applying
standards developed under the Public Utility Holding Company Act to corporations
outside the public utility field. The Lea Bill, H. R. 6968, subjects to administrative
supervision the solicitation of proxies, deposits and assents in reorganizations, volun-
tary readjustments, and debt arrangements of all types of corporations. The
Barkley Bill, S. 2344, aims to impose true fiduciary duties on trustees under inden-
tures. The Borah-O'Mahoney Bill, S. 3072, providing for federal licensing of cor-
porations in interstate commerce, restricts the power of a corporation to hold stock
in another corporation and seeks to eliminate nonvoting stocks.
Further legislation utilizing these standards may result from the report of the
Joint Congressional-Executive Committee engaged in investigating monopoly and
concentration of economic power. The function of the SEC in this investigation is
to report on corporate finance and corporate structures, including the advisability
and feasibility of federal incorporation or licensing of corporations engaged in in-
terstate commerce.
HeinOnline  -- 52 Harv. L. Rev. 216 1938-1939
1938] PUBLIC UTILITY UFOLDING COMPANY ACT 217
garded as particularly objectionable in the public utility field where
corporate structures and securities had attained a high degree of
complexity.' The Act proposes to eliminate some of these prac-
tices and modify others by a comprehensive program of simplifica-
tion which is designed to narrow the gap between ownership and
management and affects the securities of the individual company,
its corporate structure, and the set-up of the holding company
system to which it belongs.
Our purpose here is to examine the record of the Commission
during the three years it has been administering the Act to ascer-
tain what standards have been adopted and how they have been
imposed.' While at the present stage of administration the Com-
mission's releases afford a very incomplete picture, it is possible to
indicate the general direction in which the Commission is moving.'
The effect of the Act upon corporate finance and management can
best be analyzed through the medium of two general questions.
First, what has been its impact upon securities issued and upon
the corporate structure both of individual companies and of hold-
ing company systems? Second, to what extent has the Act tended
to impose new concepts of fiduciary responsibility upon those
participating in corporate finance and management?
I. CORPORATE STRUCTURES, SECURITIES AND THEIR
PROVISIONS
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act together provide the cornerstone in
the process of achieving simplification of the structure of indi-
vidual companies and their securities. Section 6(a), as the prel-
3 For a general survey of the public utility industry, see FED. TRADE Com. REPORT
ON THE EcoN oIc, FINANcIAL AND CORPORATE PHASES OF HOLDING AND OPERATING
ComANIEs OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIEs, SEN. Doc. No. 92, 7oth Cong., Ist Sess.
(1935) pt. 72A, cc. 4, 6, referred to hereinafter as UTILITY CORPORATIONS. See also
BERLE AND MEANS, THE M ODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), par-
ticularly bk. I, cc. V, VI, and bk. I, cc. I, II, IV-VI.
4 Limitations of space prevent consideration of certain important aspects of the
Commission's administration of the Act. The creation of new standards in the field
of accounting and dividends will not be discussed. Also excluded are problems of
exemptions under §§ 2, 3 and 6(b), though some reference will be made to one phase
of the last-named section.
5 The problems of integration of public utility systems have not as yet been
dealt with by the Commission in a manner comprehensive enough to warrant present
discussion. See pp. 232-33, infra.
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ude to Section 7, declares the issuance of securities and the altera-
tion of certain rights of holders of outstanding securities to be
unlawful, except upon compliance with Section 7. This latter
section sets forth standards for determining both the proper cor-
porate structure of a company and the nature of the securities
which may go to make up that structure. At the same time sub-
section (b) of Section 6 permits certain exemptions from Section
7, of which perhaps the most important is the issuance by an
operating company of securities for the purpose of financing its
business when authorized by the commission of the state in which
the company is organized and doing business.6 The Commission,
however, may attach to the granting of these exemptions "such
terms and conditions as it deems appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors or consumers." Thus even
though the Act does purport to make a distinction between hold-
ing companies and operating companies, for all practical purposes
the Commission is in a position to require of both substantial com-
pliance with the standards of Section 7 and in this way to make
the exemption illusory. That such may be the policy of the Com-
mission on occasion is indicated in several recent cases.7
6 This provision seems to have been a compromise between the Senate and the
House. In the Senate bill prior to the conference report, § 6(a) applied to any
registered holding company and any subsidiary thereof, while in the House bill it
applied to any registered holding company and to any subsidiary thereof which was
a public utility company, the issuance of whose securities was not subject to regu-
lation by a state commission. The point of view of the House apparently was that
the Act should not apply where a state commission was in a position to remedy the
abuses. See 79 CONG. Rac. 14619 (1935).
7 For example, in American Light & Traction Company, Holding Company Act
Release No. 1272, October 14, 1938, an application was made for exemption under
§ 6(b) of the issue and sale of certain bonds and notes. The applicant was organized
and doing business in Michigan, the issue and sale were solely for the purpose of
financing its business, and approval of the Michigan Public Utilities Commission had
been obtained. However, persons controlling the underwriters of the securities
were also interested indirectly as stockholders in the applicant. Accordingly, the
Commission made a detailed examination of the underwriting arrangements and
made sure that the prices at which the bonds and notes were sold to the under-
writers were fair and that the underwriters' spreads were reasonable. If the Commis-
sion had not been satisfied on these two points presumably the exemption would
still have been granted, but subject to conditions as to the prices and the spreads.
The applicant was able to bring itself within the express language of the exemptive
provision of § 6(b), but nevertheless the Commission followed a procedure of in-
vestigation identical with that employed in passing on issues and sales of securities
under § 7. See cases discussed at pp. 238-41, infra.
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The fundamental tests with respect to the issuance of securities
are found in subsections (c) (i) and (c) (2) of Section 7. A brief
r6sum6 of their provisions is helpful in providing a general back-
ground.
The ideal corporate structure contemplated by subsection
(c) (i) appears to be one class of stock and one class of bonds.
In the case of stock the type desired is "a common stock having
a par value and being without preference as to dividends or dis-
tribution over, and having at least equal voting rights with, any
outstanding security of the declarant." For a bond to qualify it
must be secured by a first lien on physical property of the declar-
ant, or by an obligation of a subsidiary of the declarant which is
secured by a first lien on physical property of the subsidiary, or
by any other assets of the type and character which the Commis-
sion may prescribe "as appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." Thus both the ideal corporate struc-
ture and the ideal types of securities are in accord with the Act's
dominant theme of simplicity.
These standards of subsection (c) (i) are deprived of much
of their significance by the alternative provisions of subsection
(c) (2). Without requiring compliance with any of them, the
Commission, under paragraph (A) of the latter subsection, may
permit a holding company or an operating company to issue se-
curities as part of a refunding or exchange operation.8 Under
Other examples where the Commission has granted exemptions subject to condi-
tions are Cumberland County Light & Power Company, Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. ioi6, March 3, 1938; Toledo Edison Company, Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. 12o6, August 16, 1938; Virginia Electric and Power Company, Holding
Company Act Release No. 1262, October 5, 1938; Michigan Consolidated Gas Com-
pany, Holding Company Act Release No. 1263, October 6, 1938; Virginia Public
Service Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1296, October 31, 1938. See
also Indiana General Service Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1261,
October S, 1938, discussed at p. 256, infra.
While this policy of the Commission would seem to be contrary to the intent of
the House conferees in agreeing to the Senate version of § 6(a), it does not conflict
with the literal language of the clause. However, there does seem to be no justifi-
cation for subjecting an issue and sale of securities to the surveillance of two com-
missions, one state and the other federal, with the attendant unnecessary expenses.
8 Section 7(c) (2) (A) provides that the Commission must find that the securities
are to be issued or sold solely "for the purpose of refunding, extending, exchanging,
or discharging an outstanding security of the declarant and/or a predecessor com-
pany thereof or for the purpose of effecting a merger, consolidation, or other
reorganization."
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paragraph (B) similar treatment is provided for securities of an
operating company issued for the purpose of financing its busi-
ness.9 Consequently the principal effect of the standards of sub-
section (c) (i) is on securities of a holding company issued to raise
funds for holding company purposes.' But even here paragraph
(D) of subsection (c) (2) permits the Commission to relieve a de-
clarant from compliance with subsection (c) (i) where the issue
is "for necessary and urgent corporate purposes" and where the
requirements of subsection (c) (i) "would impose an unreason-
able financial burden upon the declarant and are not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
or consumers."
The record of public utility financing from 1935 through 1938
bears out the conclusion that as yet subsection (c) (i) has had
little significance. Nearly all the declarations regarding new is-
sues have become effective under subsection (c) (2), principally
because most of such financing has been refunding in nature and
falls within the express terms of paragraph (A). Furthermore,
the capital market has been unreceptive to new security issues of
public utility holding companies, to which subsection (c) (i) par-
ticularly applies." Nevertheless, subsection (c) (x) remains the
ultimate goal to be attained and the Commission is not likely to
lose sight of it in passing on security issues under the supplemental
authority of subsection (d) of Section 7.12
9 Section 7(c) (2) (B) provides that the Commission must find that the securities
are to be issued or sold solely "for the purpose of financing the business of the
declarant as a public utility company."
10 Subsection (c) (i) is aimed at new issues of holding company securities for
holding company purposes, for such issues were felt to be subject to the most fre-
quent abuse. But issues of securities by subsidiary and operating companies for
operating purposes, or to use the language of the Act, "public utility" purposes [see
§ 2 (a) (3)-(5)], are not so restricted and any type of security can be issued which
complies with § 7 (d).
11 In addition to general causes, two factors in particular seem to have been
responsible for this state of the capital market. One has been the Act itself, for
with enforcement of § ii in the offing, there was little inclination to buy holding
company securities. The other has been the threat of government competition in
the operating field, upon which the holding company necessarily depends for its life
blood. This threat also has adversely affected the market for "equity capital" for
operating companies. See Bonbright, Public Ownership and National Power Policy
(1938) 28 YALE REViEW 36.
12 See Address of Abe Fortas, Esq., Assistant Director of the Public Utilities
[VOL. 52
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Subsections (d) and (e) of Section 7, relating respectively to
the issue of securities and to alteration of rights of existing se-
curity holders, prescribe general rather than specific tests. Con-
sequently, they are all the more readily available as vehicles for
the imposition of standards. Couched in negative terms, these
subsections permit a declaration to become effective unless the
Commission makes adverse findings on the basis of specified gen-
eral criteria, the broadest of which is whether such declaration
has results detrimental to the public interest or the interests of
investors or consumers."
Of the many releases of the Commission, by far the greater pro-
portion have been routine in nature and do not merit comment.
But a few contain indications that imposition of standards by the
Commission is bringing about some changes in corporate finance
and management. It is in these that the impact of the Act on
corporate structures and securities is to be discerned.
No-par Stock. The use of no-par stock, and to a lesser degree
that of low-par shares, has often been cited as a responsible factor
in facilitating the spectacular public utility promotions of the pre-
depression era. The power of corporate directors to allocate the
consideration received upon the issuance of no-par stock in part
to surplus, and the elasticity of price in the case of low-par shares
Division of the SEC, before the practicing law courses held in New York City,
October 27, 1938. Copies of this address have been released by the Commission.
13 Subsection (d) specifically provides: "If the requirements of subsections (c)
and (g) [the latter referring to failure to comply with state laws] are satisfied, the
Commission shall permit a declaration regarding the issue or sale of a security to
become effective unless the Commission finds that-
(i) the security is not reasonably adapted to the security structure of the
declarant and other companies in the same holding-company system;
(2) the security is not reasonably adapted to the earning power of the declarant;
(3) financing by the issue and sale of the particular security is not necessary
or appropriate to the economical and efficient operation of a business in
which the applicant lawfully is engaged or has an interest;
(4) the fees, commissions, or other remuneration, to whomsoever paid, directly
or indirectly, in connection with the issue, sale, or distribution of the se-
curity are not reasonable;
(5) in the case of a security that is a guaranty of, or assumption of liability
on, a security of another company, the circumstances are such as to con-
stitute the making of such guaranty or the assumption of such liability an
improper risk for the declarant; or
(6) the terms and conditions of the issue or sale of the security are detrimental
to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers."
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made it easier to create an initial surplus available for dividends.
The danger of permitting dividends to be paid from such a sur-
plus has been a major criticism of both types of stock. 4
The Act is sufficiently comprehensive to permit the Commis-
sion to control both no-par and low-par shares. The no-par device
is specifically excluded from the approved type of common stock
in subsection (c) (i) of Section 7, so despite the infrequent appli-
cation of the subsection, such exclusion would establish a heavy
presumption against its issuance in any case."5 Apart from this
presumption, the Commission derives broad authority from other
sections of the Act to eliminate any abuse of either no-par or
low-par shares. Under subsections (d) and (e) of Section 7, a
wrongful allocation to surplus could be held "detrimental to the
public interest or the interest of investors or consumers." Fur-
thermore the Commission has control over dividend declarations
and accounting practices under Sections 12 (c) and 15.
Of the two types of shares, no-par stock has figured more
prominently in the opinions of the Commission. Like so many
other practices, no-par stock is not per se harmful. Its evils lie
in the way it has been used. Since the various elements responsi-
ble for these evils can be controlled under the general authority of
the Commission, and since no-par stock can become a useful in-
,strument under many circumstances, no necessity appears for a
rigid rule prohibiting its issuance altogether.
This principle the Commission happily has recognized in sev-
eral cases and the issuance of no-par shares has been permitted.
The value of the device and the manner in which the Commission
has subjected it to control is well illustrated in the case of National
Gas and Electric Corporation."6 The declarant was seeking to
amend its certificate of incorporation to change its existing $io
14 The use of no-par shares in the public utility field is described in UTILITY
CORPORATIONS, pt. 72A, c. 6, pp. 389-94. For discussion of the various problems
arising in connection with the use of such shares, see Bonbright, The Dangers of
Shares Without Par Value (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 449; BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW
oF CORPORATION FINANcE (1928) C. 4; Weiner, The Amount Available for Dividends
Where No-Par Shares Have Been Issued (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 906; Ballantine,
Nonpar Stock-Its Use and Abuse (1923) 57 Am. L. REV. 233; Note ('937) 37
COL. L. REV. 936, 972.
15 See National Gas & Electric Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No.
768, August 4, 1937, P. 7.
16 Holding Company Act Release No. 768, August 4, 1937.
[VOL. 52222
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par common stock to no-par common and to issue additional
shares of such stock. The case was complicated by two existing
transactions. First, the declarant wished to purchase certain gas
properties from another company in return for shares of its com-
mon stock, which the vendor gas company had agreed to take at
$7.50 per share. The Commission found that the acquisition of
these gas properties by the declarant was for a " necessary and
urgent" corporate purpose. Secondly, the declarant was obli-
gated to purchase the assets of another company which was being
reorganized under former Section 7 7 B of the Bankruptcy Act.
The plan of reorganization called for the exchange of such assets
for declarant's $io par value common stock. Since the existing
common stock could not be issued for the gas properties at less
than par, there were three possible alternatives. A second class
of common stock of $7.50 par value could be created; the par value
of the existing common could be reduced to $7.50; or the existing
common could be changed to a no-par stock. The Commission
without hesitation rejected the first alternative as wholly unde-
sirable. As to the second the declarant argued that the reduction
would create a surplus which might be detrimental to its selling
certain bonds which it planned to issue, as well as harming its
credit in general. Moreover, it argued, to change the stock to
$7.50 par would require resubmission of the plan of reorganization
of the company in Section 77B which was selling its assets to de-
clarant, for such a reduction would constitute a material change.
But the change to no-par stock would not require such resubmis-
sion since the value at which the no-par stock was to be carried on
declarant's books was the equivalent of $io and hence the change
was not a material one. The declarant also stated that it proposed
to capitalize the entire amount received for the no-par shares.
Confronted with this situation the Commission approved the
issue. It found that since no part of the consideration received
for the shares would be allocated to surplus and in view of the
restrictions imposed by the Act as a whole, the no-par shares were
the practical equivalent of par shares. In view of this the Com-
mission felt the declarant had met the burden of clause (D) of
subsection (c) (2) and shown that compliance with subsection
(c) (i) was neither necessary nor appropriate. Thus no-par stock
was utilized in such a way as to benefit all persons concerned, and
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it was demonstrated that by imposing proper safeguards no blan-
ket prohibition of its use was necessary."
Distribution of Voting Power Among Stockholders. In the
"ideal" corporate structure suggested in subsection (c) (i) of
Section 7, one standard prescribed for any stock issue is that its
voting power shall be at least equal to that of any outstanding
security of the declarant. This is a direct attack on the frequent
provisions of the twenties whereby the stockholder either was de-
prived entirely of a right to vote or that right was seriously re-
stricted. Unlike the no-par stock question discussed above, vot-
ing power, once defined, is a matter which the Commission cannot
supervise properly by curbing its collateral abuses. The evil, if
any, lies in the control exercised by persons having a negligible in-
vestment in the company, which in turn leads to inadequate rep-
resentation of those parties who have the most substantial invest-
ment in the enterprise.
In addition to Section 7 (c) (i), which at present has little prag-
matic significance, the Commission derives authority from other
provisions of the Act to enforce the principle of equal distribution
of voting power. Section 7(d) (6) enables the Commission to
pass upon the terms and conditions of the issue or sale of any se-
curity, and Section 7 (e) expressly empowers it to prevent any al-
teration in voting rights of existing stockholders if such alteration
results in an unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power.
Moreover, Section i i (b) (2) contains a similar phrase in requiring
the Commission to ensure that the corporate structure of any com-
pany in a system does not unfairly or inequitably distribute voting
power. In regard to common stock the principal significance of
these provisions up to the present time has been in reorganizations
with reference to its distribution under the plan. Since in such
situations the problem of voting power usually is only one element
of the larger problem of the fairness of the plan, it will be reserved
for consideration later herein in that connection.18
17 The Commission has permitted the issuance of no-par stock in other in-
stances. See General Public Utilities, Inc., Holding Company Act Release No. 889,
November i9, 1937 (dividend payable in cash or fractional shares of no-par stock,
at stockholders option, to avoid tax on undistributed profits); Lone Star Gas
Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No. 1244, September ig, 1938 (delay
incident to authorization of par value common stock by stockholders would en-
danger possibility of effecting the contemplated financing).
18 Seep. 247 et seq., infra.
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The importance of distribution of voting power is not confined
to common stocks. In the past many preferred issues had no vote
whatever or a voting power contingent upon default in certain
dividend payments. Often this contingent voting power was illu-
sory, either because the conditions upon which the contingency
was to occur were exceedingly remote or because even when such
voting power did come into existence it was insufficient to overcome
a preponderant vote of the common stock.
Already the Commission has given definite indication that this
situation cannot continue and that preferred stocks must be given
substantial voting rights. In American Waterworks & Electric
Co., 1'9 preferred stocks of various companies in the system had
voting rights contingent upon default in dividend payments, but
upon the happening of the contingency the preferred shares only
voted share for share with the common shares. In some com-
panies the shares of common stock in proportion to the amount
of investment represented thereby was greatly in excess of the
number of shares of preferred so that the voting rights of the pre-
ferred were likely to be ineffective. Consequently, the Commis-
sion said "that such distribution of voting power falls short of
being fair and equitable." But because the companies in the sys-
tem had long uninterrupted records of dividend payments on their
preferred stocks, and since there seemed to be substantial com-
mon stock equities in the companies, the Commission decided not
to require any change in the distribution of voting power prior to
default in dividend payments. On the other hand it did state that
it expected changes to be made to give more adequate protection
in the event of default in payment of preferred dividends." At
the same time the Commission made clear that a distinction would
be drawn in respect to requiring changes in distribution in voting
power between outstanding preferred stocks and new preferred
19 Holding Company Act Release No. 949, December 30, 1937. The case came
before the Commission through the submission of a voluntary plan under § ii(e)
to meet the simplification requirements of § ii(b).
20 See also International Paper and Power Company, Holding Company Act
Release No. 642, May 5, 1937, particularly the concurring opinion of Commissioner
Douglas (now Chairman), together with his dissenting opinion in International
Paper and Power Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 770, August 3,
1937; Republic Electric Power Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No.
1270, October 13, 1938.
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stocks. In the latter case if the preferred stock investment was
substantial it would expect the preferred stockholders to be given
an effective voice in the management even prior to default.
Voting Trusts. Related to the problem of distribution of vot-
ing power is the position of the voting trust under the Act. This
device found frequent use in the public utility field for many var-
ied purposes.2' While less open to criticism than some of the
other devices which divorce control of corporate affairs from own-
ership, nevertheless the voting trust has been attacked on that
ground.22 Under the Act it obviously conflicts with the objective
of restoring some measure of control to those having a substantial
interest in the enterprise. Moreover, the creation of a voting trust
may tend to complicate the structure of a holding company system
and therein conflict with the simplification provisions of Section
Ii(b)(2).
In view of these objections one might expect to find the voting
trust little favored by the Commission. But since the principle
behind the simplification theory is the elimination of structures
which have no function in the operation of the system, it is clear
that exceptions must be made in the case of voting trusts which
fulfill an actual need. This need is demonstrated most frequently
in reorganizations, where often plans have provided for such a
voting trust to assure the new management sufficient tenure in
office to prove its competence, or to assure bondholders of some
control during the gestation period of the new company.
When confronted with situations involving these practical con-
siderations, the Commission has sanctioned the use of the voting
trust, and as in the case of no-par stock, has recognized that in
proper cases it may be a highly effective means of accomplishing
objectives otherwise attainable only with great difficulty. In the
case of United Telephone & Electric Company 23 the Commis-
21 Two examples of the use of the voting trust as a control device existed in the
Middle West Utilities System prior to its collapse. See UTILITY CORPORATIONS,
pt. 72A, pp. 146, 405 et seq.; pt. 67, P. 714.
22 BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
at 78, suggest that control through the voting trust device is less of an abuse be-
cause "it is fixed, defined, and inalienable, with certain definite and well recognized
responsibilities attached."
23 Holding Company Act Release No. x87, August 5, 1938. See also the report
of the Commission on the plan of reorganization, Holding Company Act Release
No. 1193, August 5, 1938.
[Vol. 52
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sion's approval of a plan of reorganization was sought under Sec-
tion ii(f) of the Act. The plan allotted debentures to creditors
of the old company and new common stock to the old preferred
and common stockholders. Of this new common stock the old
preferred stockholders were to receive 97.18 per cent, and as a
result would have complete control of the corporation. However,
under the reorganization plan the new common was to be placed
in a voting trust to be held by five trustees for five years. At the
end of three of the five years a referendum was to be held among
the voting trust certificate holders to determine whether the voting
trust should be continued for the remaining two years. Three of
the five voting trustees had no financial interest whatever in the
new company. The powers of the voting trustees included the
sole power to elect directors, but on matters such as a sale or mort-
gage of all the corporate assets, changes in capital structure and
changes in the number of directors, consent of a majority of the
voting trust certificate holders was required.
The Commission at once voiced its objections to the plan on the
ground that control was taken from the stockholders and given to
trustees who had little or no interest in the company and that such
divorcement of control from ownership was to last for five years.
A second ground of criticism was that if a stockholder was un-
willing to become a voting trust certificate holder, his only alterna-
tive was to vote to reject the plan of reorganization in its entirety
and thus possibly force a continuation of the reorganization till
another plan was proposed. On the other hand the Commission
found certain factors which inclined it to favor the formation of
some sort of voting trust. The former preferred stockholders
who, without the voting trust, would be in control, were inexperi-
enced voting stockholders. No person in the existing manage-
ment was capable of acting as chief executive and no capable
executive could be obtained elsewhere without some assurance of
continuity in his position. With scattered stockholders, active
proxy campaigns from time to time might make possible frequent
shiftings in the management. But by means of the voting trust
a reasonable degree of continuity could be promised to executives.
Moreover, the creditors were insisting upon a voting trust, and
this the Commission felt was entitled to great weight. Concluding
that the need for a voting trust outweighed its possible evils, the
1938]
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Commission gave its approval conditioned on certain changes in
the reorganization plan, including a provision whereby if the
voting trust was not terminated by the referendum to be held at
the end of three years, any voting trust certificate holder would
be privileged to withdraw his stock from the voting trust. In ad-
dition the voting trustees were required to register as a holding
company. With these safeguards the Commission felt the voting
trust device had been confined to its proper function of carrying
the new company through the initial difficult period of readjust-
ment. 4
The functional character of the voting trust in reorganizations
was also recognized by the Commission in Great Lakes Utilities
Company,2 5 where its use was accepted despite the criticism that
it unduly complicated the structure of the holding company sys-
tem. Here an intermediate holding company was in reorganiza-
tion under former Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. Under
the plan of reorganization a new company was created which as-
sumed the outstanding collateral trust bonds of the old company
and issued new common stock to the former holders of the com-
pany's unsecured debt. Since over 98 per cent of such new com-
mon stock would go to the former parent of the old company, the
holders of the collateral trust bonds requested the creation of a
voting trust to hold the new common for the benefit of the new
common stockholders. Nine voting trustees were to be named, six
of whom were to represent the holders of collateral trust bonds.
The term of the voting trust was limited to a maximum of five
years, the ultimate date being that of the maturity of the outstand-
ing collateral trust bonds. In approving the voting trust the Com-
mission recognized that it would tend to complicate the corporate
structure of the holding company system, but felt this would not
be "undue" complication nor detrimental to the public interest
24 Use of a somewhat different device to carry a newly reorganized company
through its first years was approved by the Commission in West Ohio Gas Com-
pany, Holding Company Act Release No. X284, October 22, 1938, involving a re-
organization under former § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. The initial board of
directors was elected for a term of three years, thus assuring some stability in
management for that period. Four of the seven directors so elected were to be
chosen by the bondholders of the former company, two by the preferred stock-
holders and noteholders of the former company, and one by the bankruptcy court.
25 Holding Company Act Release No. 595, April 5, z937.
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or that of investors and consumers because the term of the voting
trust was definitely limited. The fact that the voting trust was
created at the instance of creditors for their own protection also
strongly influenced the Commission. Moreover, the voting trus-
tees registered as a holding company thus subjecting themselves
to some Commission supervision.
Many state legislatures have limited the permissible life of vot-
ing trusts to ten years.26 And legislatures and courts with a few
exceptions have invariably sanctioned voting trusts created for
protection of creditors. In its opinions the Commission has car-
ried the former policy even further by imposing provisions which
tend to reduce the effective life of the voting trust to considerably
less than ten years. As to the latter policy the Commission seems
impressed by the need for creditor control under certain circum-
stances and appears to be ready to sanction the voting trust device
as a permissible means of exercising that control.
Pre-emptive Rights. The normal function of the pre-emptive
right, entitling existing stockholders to subscribe to new issues, is
said to be to protect their respective participations in assets, earn-
ings and control. Created by judicial decision over a century ago,
it soon became the common practice to eliminate this right by
charter provision. More recently such charter provisions have
been expressly sanctioned by statutory enactments. While there
is considerable doubt as to whether a stockholder without a pre-
emptive right is in any worse position legally than one with such
a right,27 the fact remains that its elimination, especially when
coupled with the device of maintaining large reservoirs of author-
ized but unissued shares, contributed materially to the success not
only of desirable expansions in the public utility field but also of
promotions of a speculative nature. These latter instances suggest
one reason for the Commission to oppose attempts to eliminate the
pre-emptive right in future issues. A second reason is its removal
26 E.g., DEL. REV. CODE (i935) § 2050 (Del. Corp. Law § 18); N. Y. STX.
CoRP. LAw § 50.
27 That is, even without the pre-emptive right a stockholder is able to prevent
the issuance of stock for an inadequate consideration. Likewise, he can have set
aside an issue for the sole purpose of affecting control of the corporation. See
Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Issues (1930)
43 H1Av. L. REv. 586; Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
563.
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also may increase the difficulty of bridging the gap between man-
agement and ownership by preventing existing stockholders from
maintaining their position in a company. At the same time it is
clear that under certain circumstances the denial of the pre-
emptive right may be justified on the purely practical ground of
facilitating the financing process.
In striving to protect the interests of stockholders without un-
duly hampering financing, the Commission may be expected to
propound its own standards of judgment under Sections 7(d) (6)
and 7(e) as to whether the denial of the pre-emptive right in a
particular case is" detrimental to the public interest or the interest
of investors or consumers." 28 Hence, it is no surprise to find the
Commission disapproving the waiver of the pre-emptive right in
Peoples Light & Power Company 9 and approving its retention
in United Telephone & Electric Company.8" But the most inter-
esting commentary on the future of the pre-emptive right is in
National Gas & Electric Corporation.8 The proposed amend-
ment to the certificate of incorporation, in addition to changing
the $io par stock to no-par, also sought to remove the stockholders'
pre-emptive right. The amendment was approved by an affirma-
tive vote of 75 per cent of the holders of the voting trust certifi-
cates and the remaining 25 per cent did not dissent. While view-
ing with disapproval this method of securing approval of the
amendment by capitalizing on the inertia of security holders, the
Commission permitted the declaration to become effective under
Section 7 (e). But in its opinion the Commission made clear that
its permission to sell the stock without first offering it to existing
stockholders was confined to the immediate issue and that as to
any future issues the Commission might require a prior offering
to existing stockholders if it was deemed necessary to protect their
interests in assets, earnings or voting power. Indeed, the Com-
mission stated that as to future issues the burden would be on the
declarant to establish that such a prior offering was not necessary
or appropriate to protect the interests of existing stockholders.
The new stock in this case was being issued for property. It
28 This phrase appears in both §§ 7(d)(6) and 7(e).
29 Holding Company Act Release No. 885, November i6, 1937.
30 Holding Company Act Release No. 1193, August 5, 1938.
31 Holding Company Act Release No. 768, August 4, 1937, discussed at pp. 222-23
supra, in connection with no-par stock.
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will be remembered that after having created the pre-emptive
right, courts found it necessary for purely practical reasons to
make an exception and hold that in such situations, despite the
possibility of receipt of inadequate consideration, no pre-emptive
right existed. While not so stated in the Commission's opinion, it
seems to recognize the practical considerations upon which the
property exception rests. From this it may be surmised that nor-
mally issues of stock for property will not be required to be first
offered to existing stockholders, though the exception cannot be
expected to solidify into a rule of practice of the Commission as it
did into a rule of law in the courts. But even where such an issue
is permitted the Commission will still pass on the value of the
property and thus be able to prevent the issuance of stock for
inadequate consideration with resultant injury to existing stock-
holders.
So far as issues of stock for cash are concerned the opinion in
National Gas and Electric Company definitely rendered ineffec-
tive the elimination of the pre-emptive right. As a result, if the
case is at all prophetic, it is entirely immaterial whether or not the
certificate of incorporation of any public utility or holding com-
pany already has eliminated the pre-emptive right. Regardless
of charter provisions, the Commission will act to afford what
amounts to the pre-emptive right in situations where it is deemed
necessary for the protection of existing stockholders against dilu-
tion of their interests."
Holding Company System Structures. Just as Sections 6 and 7
afford the basis for simplifying the structure and securities of indi-
32 Under § 7(d) (6), the most pertinent section on this point, the Commission's
power extends to the "terms and conditions of the issue or sale" of a stock, and
not to provisions of the stock itself. Accordingly, while the Commission may
compel a prior offering to existing stockholders upon the issue or sale of a stock,
seemingly it cannot compel the inclusion of the pre-emptive right in the stock.
However, the Commission has implied that it has power to compel such an inclu-
sion. In Republic Electric Power Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No.
1270, October 13, 1938, involving voluntary reorganization under § ii(e), the new
common stock to be issued was to have no pre-emptive right. Finding that the
stockholders would be few in number and that a majority of the stock would be
owned by a single stockholder, and because the company would still be under the
supervision of state commissions, the Commission stated that "the inclusion of
preemptive rights will not be insisted upon in this case." On the pre-emptive right
generally, see also Washington Gas Light Company, Holding Company Act Release
No. 117, June 9, 1938.
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vidual companies, Section ii is designed to simplify the structure
of holding company systems. Its objective is twofold. First, to
create geographically integrated systems whose business is con-
fined to operating gas or electric properties. Second, to eliminate
unnecessary complexity in the corporate structure of holding com-
pany systems and to distribute voting control among the security
holders fairly and equitably.3
Up to the present time the Commission has been slow to enforce
these simplification provisions. By its very terms Section i I (b)
did not become applicable until after January i, 1938. The delay
since that time is explained in part by the inadvisability of pro-
ceeding until the Supreme Court had established the constitution-
ality of the registration provisions of the Act in February, 1938."
But additional reasons for caution are apparent. The mere prepa-
ration of a plan for any major utility system requires time. The
realignment of companies and properties within and between sys-
tems necessarily requires the redemption of old securities and the
issuance of new, which in turn demands a brisk capital market.
Moreover, the Commission wished to feel its way carefully, moti-
vated perhaps by a desire to convert seemingly unworkable pro-
visions of Section i i into useful instruments for achieving the ob-
jectives of the Act as a whole. Thereby the establishment of
embarrassing precedents has been avoided and simplification
made an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. So it
was quite natural for the Commission to adopt a policy of permit-
ting companies to take the initiative in most cases by giving them
leave until December 1, 1938, to file voluntary plans. The only
case where it invoked Section i i (b) involved a company under-
going reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. 5 Since some
classes of security holders of the bankrupt had to accept a diminu-
tion of their interests, this case was a logical one for compelling a
drastic overhauling of its structure and achieving integration of
the system.
In view of the present formative stage of the interpretation of
Section i i (b), no attempt will be made to answer those imponder-
33 The first objective is provided for in § ii(b) (i) ; the second in § ii(b) (2).
34 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 303 U. S. 419
(1938).
35 Utilities Power and Light Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No.
1167, July 20, 1938.
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ables which are the core of the integration program of subsection
(b) (i) . These questions are of tremendous importance, but in
three years, except for two cases, they remain almost completely
unanswered." Even in the second phase of the simplification pro-
gram under subsection (b) (2) it is only possible to point out
problems which the Commission has had to face in eliminating
companies which unnecessarily complicate the structure of hold-
ing company systems. Whether a system is already geograph-
ically integrated or not, this subsection limits such a structure to
three tiers of companies, consisting of operating companies, first
degree holding companies and a second degree or top holding com-
pany. This type of system structure, set forth as ideal in subsec-
tion (b) (2), the Commission has sought to accomplish not only
directly under its provisions, but also in dealing with applications
under other sections of the Act. 8
A plan achieving this ideal system structure was approved by the
Commission in American Water Works and Electric Company,
where the top holding company submitted a voluntary plan under
Section ii(e) . In respect of one subsidiary the top holding
company was a fifth degree holding company; in respect of an-
other a fourth degree relationship existed. The net result of the
various procedural steps under the plan left a top holding com-
36 Among them are questions such as what is a "single integrated public-utility
system"? What businesses "are reasonably incidental, or economically necessary
or appropriate to the operation of such integrated public-utility system "? When is
a system "so large as to impair the advantages of localized management, efficient
operation, or the effectiveness of regulation "? How important to this decision will
be the character of the region affected and the scientific development of long distance
power transmission? The Act itself makes some attempt at definition. See §§ 2(a)
(29), ii(b) (i) (A)-(C).
37 American Water Works and Electric Company, Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. 949, December 30, 1937; Republic Electric Power Corporation, Holding
Company Act Release No. 1270, October 13, 1938, stated in note 40, infra.
38 Under § iz(f) dealing with plans of reorganization under court supervision,
the Commission has had opportunities to clear the way for more complete simplifi-
cation in the future. Under § io(c) (i), regarding the acquisition of securities and
utility assets, approval of the Commission cannot be given if the acquisition is detri-
mental to carrying out § ri(b). Even in declarations under § 7 the Commission has
kept in mind the ultimate disposition of the particular system and its companies
under § ii(b).
19 Holding Company Act Release No. 949, December 3o, 1937; Note (1938) 36
MIcH. L. REv. i36 ; (I938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 928.
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pany, three subsidiary companies which were both operating and
first degree holding companies, and finally a bottom tier of operat-
ing companies. Thus the system structure was simplified to a
point where only one tier of companies intervened between the
top holding company and the operating companies." But the
accomplishment of this result was made possible only after a de-
cision had been reached in regard to one of the Commission's
troublesome problems under Section ii(b), namely, the many
traction interests of utility systems which it termed " in the nature
of an inheritance from an earlier era" of the electric utility busi-
ness.4' While the principal difficulties caused by the existence of
traction interests usually are part of the problem of integration,
in this instance it also imposed an impediment to achieving the
desired structure of three tiers of companies. That adroit use of
the exemptive provisions may provide an answer for this problem
is demonstrated in West Penn Railways Company.42 A traction
subsidiary of American Water Works and Electric Company owned
31 per'cent of the stock of West Penn Power Company. All the
40 The second integration case before the Commission has been resolved in a
somewhat analogous fashion. In Republic Electric Power Corporation, Holding
Company Act Release No. 1270, October 13, 1938, the declarant owned properties
scattered through Oklahoma, Oregon and California. Submitting a voluntary plan
of simplification under § ii(e) and supplemental sections, the declarant proposed
to dispose of its Oklahoma property, to merge all the Oregon and California com-
panies into a single operating unit, and finally to dissolve itself as a holding com-
pany. Noting that some of the properties in the new operating unit were separated
by long distances so that no single integrated system could exist, the Commission
nevertheless approved the plan. In so doing the Commission knowingly surrendered
jurisdiction over the new operating company, for being neither a holding company
nor a subsidiary company, it would no longer fall within the terms of the Act.
The reasons assigned for failure to enforce the integration mandate of § ii (b) (i)
were that the properties were largely isolated, their retention did not stand in the
way of plans of integration of other systems, and they were small and could be
managed more economically by a single operating company than as separate com-
panies. Here the Commission dearly avoided the issue and left a group of proper-
ties which may never be integrated. There is some question whether or not it should
be governed solely by the fact that the properties are small and hence of minor
importance. Yet without additional facts it is impossible to determine whether or
not these properties could have been integrated at all, even into other systems.
The inference is that they could not. On this hypothesis control of the small isolated
units by a single operating company appears to be a practical solution of a problem
occasioned in large measure by the sweeping requirement of § i (b) () that all sys-
tems be integrated.
41 See Holding Company Act Release No. 949, December 30, 1937, p. 12.
42 Holding Company Act Release No. 953, January 3, 1938.
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remaining stock of West Penn Power Company was owned directly
by American Water Works and Electric Company. If the traction
company had been held to be a holding company and West Penn
Power Company its subsidiary, there would have been four tiers
of companies in the system and the requirements of Section
ii(b) (2) would not be satisfied. Accordingly the traction com-
pany applied for orders under Sections 2 (a) (7) and (8) declaring
it not to be a holding company and declaring West Penn Power
Company not to be its subsidiary.
Simplification by transferring the traction company's 3 1 per cent
stock interest to American Water Works and Electric Company
would have raised a further problem. Such a transfer was prac-
tically impossible because it was the most valuable security for
the traction company's outstanding noncallable first mortgage
bonds. Various restrictive provisions in the indenture securing
these bonds created additional complications. Likewise simplifi-
cation by elimination of the traction company as a separate entity
was impractical from a financial standpoint because of the sub-
stantial size of the traction interests. Confronted with this di-
lemma, the Commission granted the application, finding that the
nature of the relationship of American Water Works and Electric
Company to West Penn Power Company through the traction
company was merely that of exercising a " controlling influence"
rather than " control," and therefore the Commission had the dis-
cretion to find that the traction company and West Penn Power
Company were not holding company and subsidiary.
A more difficult problem is presented when application is made
for permission to create a new company which will further com-
plicate the structure of a holding company system. Thus far
cases have arisen where such creation is necessary as the sole
means for raising new capital for expansion activities or as a de-
vice for liquidating certain companies which cannot ultimately be
retained under Section i i (b). An example of the former is Vir-
ginia East Coast Utilities 48 where the applicant wished to con-
struct additional rural electrification lines. The Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration which was supplying the funds required that
all loans be secured by a direct first mortgage on the property
43 1 S. E. C. 887 (1936); Holding Company Act Release No. 475, December 14,
1936.
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constructed with the proceeds of the loan. Such a mortgage the
applicant itself could not give because of an after-acquired prop-
erty clause in its own mortgage. Moreover, all applicant's exist-
ing first mortgage bonds and common stock were pledged under
a trust indenture securing bonds of its parent company, which
indenture contained a covenant not to permit any subsidiary such
as the applicant to issue any additional securities of any kind unless
such securities were delivered to the trustee under the indenture
as further security for the parent's bonds. The simplest way to
avoid these indenture provisions was to create a new company and
have it issue bonds secured by a first mortgage on the property
constructed with the proceeds. This procedure the Commission
approved even though it added one more layer to an already com-
plicated structure, because plans for ultimate simplification were
said to be under discussion by which the new company would be
absorbed. But it is interesting to note that in reaching this result
the Commission approved a financing technique the use of which
often has been the subject of condemnation.44
An example of the latter situation where a new company has
been created as a device for liquidating companies which ulti-
mately cannot be retained under Section i i (b) is States Electric
& Gas Corporation." A new company was organized on a" shoe-
string" and to it was to be transferred voting control in miscel-
laneous subsidiaries of the International Utilities Corporation
system, located in a territory extending from New Mexico to South
Carolina. This new corporation was to afford the machinery by
which the system properties were to be rearranged so as to comply
with Section ii(b). Referring to Section io(b) and (c), the
Commission admitted that the transaction obviously was contrary
to the spirit and letter of the Act if it was to be treated as the
promotion of a new holding company enterprise. But since its
character was essentially private and since it might be regarded
as a reorganization providing for the orderly liquidation of prop-
erties in conformity with Section ii, the Commission gave its
approval. Here again the Commission has taken a device con-
44 A somewhat comparable situation exists where a new corporation is formed
and assets transferred to it to avoid the effect of negative pledge clauses in inden-
tures. See SEC REPORT ON PROTECTIVE AND REORGAmIZATION Connnfzs (June 18,
1936) pt. VI, at 12.
45 Holding Company Act Release No. 712, June 24, 1937.
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demned in principle as bad and converted it into a means of fur-
thering the policy of the Act. Practical considerations again were
the compelling force.4"
All the foregoing cases merely raise problems incidental to the
elimination of unnecessary complexity in holding company sys-
tems. Only in the case of Genesee Valley Gas Company, Inc.47
has the Commission indicated a complete and satisfactory solu-
tion. The application was for approval of a plan of reorganiza-
tion by the Commission prior to its submission to the bankruptcy
court under former Section 7 7B. The applicant was a first degree
holding company with two tiers of holding companies above it.
Of its four operating subsidiaries only Pavilion Natural Gas Com-
pany was of appreciable size, representing not only most of the
total property value of the combined companies but also contribut-
ing the bulk of the applicant's income. The Commission objected
to the reorganization plan on several grounds but the one of in-
terest here was the utter failure to eliminate any units from the
holding company system structure so as to make it conform with
the requirements of Section ii(b).48 Accordingly the Commis-
sion suggested first that the applicant and the holding company
above it should be dissolved, and second, that all applicant's sub-
sidiary operating companies within the State of New York be
merged into a single operating unit.
II. IMPOSITION OF NEw FimucLaRy CONCEPTS
The divorcement of ownership from control in the predepres-
sion era exposed management groups to the constant temptation
of permitting self-interest to outweigh their duty to the security
holders. Criticism of these conflicting interests was an important
factor in the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. Its provisions afford a starting point from which the Com-
mission is proceeding to impose new fiduciary responsibilities on
46 If an application similar to that in States Electric and Gas Corporation was
made to the Commission today, it is doubtful whether it would be approved. Hav-
ing set December 1, 1938, as the date for submission of voluntary plans to achieve
compliance with § ix(b), it would seem that further complication of this sort would
not be permitted unless the new company was purely a liquidating vehicle.
47 Holding Company Act Release No. 981, January 24, 1938.
48 Another objection of the Commission to the plan is discussed at pp. 247-50,
infra.
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the part of those participating in public utility finance and man-
agement. Already progress has been made in establishing new
standards of conduct and requiring strict adherence to them.
Up to the present time these conflicts of interest have come to
the Commission's attention in two types of factual situations.
First, in the issuance of securities, conflicts exist by reason of the
relations between managements and underwriters. Second, in re-
organizations and recapitalizations conflicts arise in connection
with the preparation and submission of plans altering the rights
of security holders.
Conflicts of Interest in Underwriting Relations. Prior to 1935
close tie-ups between issuers of securities and underwriters were
normal. Often they amounted to nothing more than an established
practice of dealing with certain underwriters over a long period
of years. In other instances, including the public utility field, the
relation was much closer. Some holding company systems con-
tained a separate subsidiary set up for the sole purpose of handling
the underwriting arrangements for the entire system. Not infre-
quently underwriting firms were represented on the directorates of
top holding companies. 9 In such underwriting relationships the
possibility of abuses when conflicts of interest were present af-
forded the Commission an obvious reason for exercising its super-
visory authority. Consequently, the Commission has established
the practice of making a detailed examination of the relationship
between the issuer and the underwriters and of all relevant facts in
regard to the particular issue. The objective of this examination
is to make sure that no one profits at the expense of the issuer from
the failure of the parties to bargain at arm's length. Hence, of par-
ticular interest are the consideration received by the issuer and the
spread of the underwriters. Two cases well illustrate the nature
of this examination.
In Kansas Electric Power Company,"0 approval of a declaration
covering the issuance of first mortgage bonds was sought by an
operating subsidiary of Middle West Corporation, a registered
holding company. The financing was arranged by the finance
committee of an affiliated service company in the Middle West
49 UTILITY CORPORATIONS pt. 72A, at 346-48.
50 1 S. E. C. 891 (1936), Holding Company Act Release No. 486, December 19,
1936, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. io58.
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System and two of the committee members were in effect repre-
sentatives of the principal stockholders in Middle West Corpora-
tion. In addition the head and one other member of the syndicate
of seven underwriters who took the issue controlled substantial
blocks of stock of Middle West Corporation. The fact that the
spread of two and a half points taken by the underwriters exceeded
by one quarter of a point the going rate of underwriting spreads on
comparable issues brought to the Commission's attention the exist-
ing conflicts of interest in the underwriting arrangements.5 While
the majority of the Commission were not prepared to say that the
spread of two and a half points was unreasonable in itself, they
did severely criticize the manner in which the underwriting ar-
rangements were handled and deplored the failure to introduce
any element whatever of competitive bidding. But feeling that to
compel renegotiation of the loan would prove so expensive as to
outweigh any saving which might be effected, the Commission by
a divided vote reluctantly permitted the declaration to become
effective.52
The principal significance of this phase of the case is that it
raises the controversial question of the desirability of competitive
bidding. Since the Commission was less concerned by the fact
the underwriting spread was in its opinion about one quarter of a
point too high than by " the apparent lack of effort or attempt by
the management to pay less," its position clearly seems to be that
it will require prices comparable to those which would result on
competitive bidding. Moreover, to avoid for the future the argu-
ment that renegotiation would be too expensive, shortly after this
case the Commission ruled that in all cases of issues save those
sold by public competitive bidding it would require that it be noti-
fied of the underwriting spread and of any known conflicting in-
terests of underwriters at least seven days before the declaration
could become effective.5
51 This fact is not clearly brought out in the published release. The record,
however, indicates that the question revolved about whether or not the spread was
one quarter of a point above that on comparable issues.
112 Commissioners Healy and Douglas (now Chairman) dissented on the ground
that the underwriting spread had not been justified to their satisfaction and that
the entire transaction had "the familiar reek that so often attended those deals
involving operating companies, holding companies, and investment bankers in earlier
days." See x S. E. C. 891, goo (1936).
53 i S. E. C. 891, 897 (1936). Prior to this case the Commission had required
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Actually no statement has appeared in the releases with respect
to the future necessity of competitive bidding on utility issues.
The question is still open whether the Commission must go so far
in order to achieve its objective. Even if the directors and officers
of the issuer have some affiliation with an investment banking
house, it is again doubtful, as with no-par stock and voting trusts,
whether there must be a rigid and unqualified rule as long as the
Commission remains empowered to rectify possible abuses. The
net result to the investor, issuer and the public may be approxi-
mately the same whether the parties deal at arm's length, or con-
versely, whether independent negotiation was lacking but the
opportunity for profit in violation of their fiduciary duty is
eliminated.
That for the present the Commission has no intention of re-
quiring competitive bidding is borne out by the second and more
recent case of San Antonio Public Service Company where it
pursued the policy of making sure that the consideration received
for the securities and the fees paid were the equivalent of those
which would have resulted from arm's length negotiation. An
operating utility sought approval of a declaration covering first
mortgage bonds with a spread of two and a quarter points and
serial notes with one of one and a half points. Both blocks of
securities were being sold to a group of underwriters headed by
Mellon Securities Company and Dillon, Read and Co. Persons
in control of the former also were substantial holders of stock in
Koppers United Company, which through three subsidiaries con-
trolled the issuer. In addition two directors of Dillon, Read and
Co. were also directors of an investment trust which owned almost
io per cent of the voting securities of one of the intermediate hold-
ing companies. Again there was no element of competitive bid-
ding such as attempted negotiations with underwriters other than
the group headed by Mellon Securities Company and Dillon, Read
and Co. Despite this fact the declaration was permitted to be-
come effective, for after scrutinizing the relationship between the
issuer and the underwriters, and after requiring testimony as to
the justification of the spreads, the Commission was satisfied that
such information only four days prior to the proposed effective date of the decla-
ration.
54 Holding Company Act Release No. 1107, May 31, 1938.
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the spreads were reasonable and that the prices at which the se-
curities were to be offered were in line with prices of substantially
similar securities of public utility companies resembling the issuer.
In this way the Commission felt that the results reached were
equivalent to those which would ensue upon arm's length nego-
tiation.5
Both the foregoing cases involved a standard transaction,
namely, the issuance of bonds. The issuers were benefitted by
being able to secure needed funds immediately. The financial ad-
vantages to the underwriters were specifically defined and were
customary in such transactions. Consequently strong practical
considerations influenced the Commission to permit the declara-
tions to become effective so long as the conflicting interests had
no definitely prejudicial effect. But where the transaction is not
of standard character and there is no immediate benefit to the
applicant company, any declaration will be viewed with suspicion,
especially when it appears probable that the only advantage to be
derived will be that of an underwriter with whom the declarant
has intimate ties. This was the case in Northern States Power
Company 56 where six months after an issue of preferred stock
had been sold to underwriters, the issuer sought approval of a
declaration which made that preferred stock convertible into com-
mon and which reimbursed the preferred stockholders for the
Pennsylvania five-mill tax. At that time the price of the stock
had fallen off about twenty points and the underwriters still had
on their shelves one quarter of the issue. The Commission felt the
55 Similar holdings of the Commission are to be found in Gulf States Utilities
Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1228, August 3i, 1938, and American
Light & Traction Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1272, October 14,
1938. The latter case was commented upon in note 7, supra, as an application for
exemption under § 6 (b).
Closely related to the problem of achieving fair dealings between issuer and
underwriter is the question of the "finder's fee" charged in some cases by an
affiliate of the issuer for negotiating a private offering of securities to purchasers
such as banks and insurance companies. In each of the two cases before the Com-
mission thus far where such a fee has been claimed, the issue of the securities has
been approved and jurisdiction reserved with respect to the reasonableness of the
fee. West Penn Power Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1207, August
X5, 1938; North American Edison Company, Holding Company Act Release No.
5305, November 2, 1938.
56 Holding Company Act Release No. 874, November 8, 1937, (5938) 38 CoL. L.
REv. 511.
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only persons who would derive any benefit from approval of
the declaration would be the underwriters and consequently made
the adverse finding under Section 7(d)(3) that the proposed
changes were not necessary or appropriate to economical and
efficient operation of the declarant's business. While the Commis-
sion stated that this adverse finding was 'made without deciding
whether it would be proper to give any consideration to the close
relationship which existed between certain of the principal under-
writers and the issuer, at the same time it admitted that this situa-
tion made it particularly careful in' deciding whether the declara-
tion met the statutory standards imposed by Section 7.
Conflicts of Interest in' Reorganizations. Nowhere do conflicts
of interest appear so frequently as in reorganizations. Their pres-
ence is manifest throughout the process of both voluntary and
judicial reorganizations. Consequently, reorganization practice
in the past has been far from ideal. Voluntary plans favoring
common stock interests have been formulated by the management
and "railroaded " through without affording other security hold-
ers an opportunity to understand how their interests were affected.
In judicial reorganizations severe criticism has been directed at
the almost ruthless disregard of rights of senior claimants by
dominant management and banking interests. Such criticism was
partially responsible for the recent enactment of Chapter X of the
new Bankruptcy Act, commonly known as the Chandler Act, to
replace former Section 77B."
The Public Utility Holding Company Act seeks to minimize
these conflicts of interest by administrative supervision designed
to reform the machinery by which plans of reorganization are con-
summated. Approval by the Commission of plans under court
supervision is specifically required by Section ii(f). A like result
ensues in voluntary reorganizations, for although the Commission
is not empowered to pass on a plan as such, the applications re-
quired under Sections 6, 7, io or i i(g), as the case may be, give
the Commission a power not in terms but in fact comparable to
that under Section I i (f). 58
57 Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., ix U. S. C. A. §§ 5oi-676 (Supp. 1938);
see Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. i,
5 The Commission has held that where a plan of reorganization contemplates
the issuance of securities and the acquisition of utility assets and securities, the
standards prescribed by §§ 7 and io must be complied with. United Telephone and
[Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Harv. L. Rev. 242 1938-1939
1938] PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT 243
More specifically, under the Act the Commission is endeavoring
to accomplish certain objectives:
(i) To set forth the parties eligible to submit a plan of re-
organization and to require disclosure of the interests they rep-
resent;
(2) To encourage independent representation of each class of
security holders by representatives who have only the interest of
their own class at heart;
(3) To afford security holders full information as to how the
plan affects their rights so as to enable them to assent or dissent
intelligently;
(4) To ensure that the plan, before its submission to security
holders, conforms with the Commission's standards of fairness;
(5) To regulate and impose fiduciary responsibility upon per-
sons soliciting proxies or acceptances, whether a committee or
otherwise.
The eligibility of persons to submit a plan in either a voluntary
or judicial reorganization is restricted to those having a" bona fide
interest." 11 If the Commission had wished to ensure the exclu-
sion of management from participation in the plan, this restriction
might have been found a useful instrument. In fact, Chair-
man Douglas (then Commissioner) raised a query as to this pre-
cise point in International Paper and Power Company 60 in stating
his objection to the lack of independent representation of the pre-
ferred stock in formulating a recapitalization plan. The Com-
mission's present definition of eligibility, however, is extremely
lenient, including among others the company, or any creditor or
stockholder thereof, and as yet no party has been excluded from
offering his plan of reorganization.6'
Electric Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, August 5, 1938; West
Ohio Gas Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, October 22, 1938;
Peoples Light and Power Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 885, Novem-
ber 16, 1937 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Healy). The Commission has
also held that the question of fairness of a plan of reorganization is before it
under § 7. International Paper and Power Company, Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. 77o, August 3, 1937. See also Rule iiF-i(d), General Rules and Regula-
tions under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, as amended, to and
including July i, 1938.
59 § II(g) (I).
60 Holding Company Act Release No. 642, May 5, X937, at p. 9.
61 Rule 12E-I (d), General Rules and Regulations under the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 193g, as amended, to and including July 1, 1938.
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After the enactment of Chapter X of the new Bankruptcy Act,
all persons having a " bona fide interest" are still eligible to sub-
mit plans. But they cannot do so in the early stages of the pro-
ceedings. The newly prescribed procedure of Chapter X requires
the appointment of a disinterested trustee in all cases where the
corporate indebtedness exceeds $2 5o,ooo and makes him respon-
sible for the preparation of the original plan and its submission to
the court." This centralization of authority in a trustee totally
devoid of any commitments supplements the Commission's pro-
gram of insulating the reorganization from domination by any
special group, such as management. Even before Chapter X be-
came law, the Commission initiated this policy by filing a brief
amicus curiae in the reorganization proceedings of Utilities Power
and Light Company, requesting the appointment of an independ-
ent trustee as essential to the proper solution of the debtor's
problems.
The second objective of the Commission is to stimulate greater
participation by security holders in the reorganization process
through their own independent representatives. In bankruptcy
reorganizations Chapter X of the new Bankruptcy Act does much
to bring closer its achievement. Accurate information concerning
the condition of the company is made available to interested par-
ties by imposing on the independent trustee the duties of making
an investigation and submitting a statement of his findings."
Lists of security holders, even though in possession of persons
other than the debtor or its indenture trustee, are made accessible
to all. Thus encouraged perhaps more parties will participate,
especially since compensation for their efforts is possible from the
debtor's estate. 4
At the same time, whether the reorganization is voluntary or
involuntary, the Commission is prepared to insist that the parties
62 Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 156, Ii U. S. C. A. § 556 (Supp. 3938).
However, this provision would not seem to preclude the Commission from proposing
a plan in the first instance as it is specifically empowered to do so for bankrupt
companies in the public utility field by § ii (f) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act.
63 Id. § 167(z),(5), ii U. S. C. A. § 562(1) (5) (Supp. 1938).
64 Id. §§ 242, 243, 246, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 642, 643, 646 (Supp. 3938). However,
even if greater participation by security holders does ensue, a perhaps over-optimistic
anticipation, it possibly may be largely of the "strike suit" variety.
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participating shall act as representatives of only one class of se-
curity holders. In Utilities Power and Light Corporation,65 three
individuals purporting to be a protective committee representing
debentures, preferred, class A, class B, and common stock of the
corporation being reorganized, filed a petition to intervene in the
proceedings before the Commission. The Commission felt it was
clear the committee was connected with Associated Gas & Electric
Company interests and had been organized on their behalf. Con-
sequently, there was reason to suppose that the committee's ac-
tivities would be dominated by Associated interests and independ-
ent representation would not be provided for the various securities.
However, the Commission was anxious to assure representation
of all points of view in the proceedings and the committee did
seem to have authorizations from a substantial number of security
holders. Accordingly, the intervention was permitted, subject to
the conditions that any evidence adduced by the committee would
be weighed in the light of the conflicting interests present and that
any communications to security holders should be accompanied
by a copy of the Commission's opinion.
In voluntary reorganizations the problem of stimulating greater
participation by security holders in preparation of plans is more
acute.66 The exigency confronting the security holders is not as
clear-cut as in bankruptcy nor does the revision appear as drastic.
No disinterested trustee is charged with the preparation of the
plan or of presenting facts to them. Investors other than the man-
agement group are usually without the funds necessary to partici-
pate and there is no incentive by way of possible compensation
from the estate. Indeed, probably no plan would be forthcoming
at all if management did not take the initiative. Consequently,
the Commission's greatest problem lies in overcoming the inertia
of security holders. An example of this dilemma is found in In-
ternational Paper and Power Company." A recapitalization plan
was proposed altering the rights of preferred stockholders and
eliminating a capital deficit, thus opening the way for both pre-
ferred and common dividends to avoid the tax on undistributed
65 Holding Company Act Release No. 1245, September 21, 1938.
66 SEC REPORT ON PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION C03rI"EES (May o,
1938) pt. VII, § I.
67 Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 641 and 642, May 5, 1937.
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profits. The plan was prepared by a committee composed of rep-
resentatives of both common and preferred stocks, yet those com-
mittee members representing preferred stock for the most part
also held common. 8 Consequently their position was somewhat
"neutralized" and the preferred stockholders were left without
representatives whose loyalty ran exclusively to their own class.
From the Commission's report under Section i i (g) which accom-
panied the solicitation of proxies approving or disapproving the
plan, it seems the majority were not sure whether the plan was
fair to the preferred stockholders or not but that they were willing
to permit it to be voted upon. In view of the peculiar quorum
provisions for stockholders' meetings, the majority especially
urged upon the stockholders the necessity of affirmatively voting
against the plan if they disapproved of it." Commissioner Healy
in his dissent, which also went to the stockholders, felt very
strongly that the plan was unfair to the preferred stockholders and
urged them to fill out their proxies marked "No. " " At the
stockholders' meeting which then ensued over 77 per cent of the
preferred stockholders were represented and of these 91 per cent
voted in favor of the plan.' This does seem to have been a large
representation, but nevertheless, the fact remains that in the face
of a rather striking report by the Commission over 22 per cent of
the preferred stockholders made no effort to vote. This may be
some evidence of the inertia of security holders which the Com-
mission must overcome if its policy of bringing about greater par-
ticipation in reorganizations is to be successful. Indeed it opens
to question the feasibility of the policy itself 2
68 Holding Company Act Release No. 641, May 5, 1937, p. 6.
69 Under the quorum provisions if one-third of the outstanding shares, regard-
less of class, were represented at a meeting, a quorum was present. There were two
classes of preferred stock and three of common. Consequently, merely withholding
a proxy would hardly be an effective dissent.
70 Holding Company Act Release No. 641, May 5, 1937, PP. 18-22.
Tt Holding Company Act Release No. 77o, August 3, 1937.
72 Of course this silence is ambiguous. Perhaps these 22% of the preferred
stockholders liked the plan and felt it was unnecessary to vote.
In some cases it does not seem unlikely but that the policy of bringing all facts
to the attention of the security holders may discourage rather than encourage greater
participation of security holders. For example, the ballots which were sent out in
the American Gas and Power Company case, discussed at p. 252, infra, together with
the Commission's report on the plan and other data, were so complicated as to dis-
hearten any but the most persistent of security holders.
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Whether or not the parties act affirmatively on the basis of in-
formation afforded them, the Commission at least has accom-
plished its objective of bringing to their attention the purpose of
the plan, its precise character and the alternatives available, to-
gether with a description of its sponsors. Irrespective of the char-
acter of a reorganization, solicitation of any consents thereto is
made unlawful by Section i i (g) unless the plan is first submitted
to the Commission together with adequate information regarding
it and its sponsors. This information is then conveyed to the se-
curity holders in the report on the plan by the Commission which
must accompany or precede the solicitation." The International
Paper and Power Company case is an illustration of this procedure.
As noted above, in practical effect the Commission passes upon
both judicial and voluntary plans of reorganization. In such cases
the question of fairness of the allocation of new securities is before
it under Section 7. But as a preliminary to determining fairness it
is necessary to value a company's property. In making such valua-
tions the Commission early committed itself to the policy that earn-
ing power should be the paramount criterion. At the same time
it has always carefully analyzed a company's property account to
ascertain the value at which assets were taken on the books so as to
eliminate any write-ups. Finally, it has manifested its unwilling-
ness to accept reproduction cost as a true measure of value. 4
Up to the present time the question of fairness has been con-
sidered by the Commission in five cases, two voluntary and three
under former Section 77B. In Genesee Valley Gas Company,
Inc.,7 5 under Section 77 B, the Commission indicated that in ascer-
taining the fairness of a plan it would look to the established prece-
dents of the courts, whether in equity or under the Bankruptcy
Act. Thus at the outset it has raised the question of whether it
will adopt the theory of strict priority growing out of the doctrine
of the Boyd case."' In the Genesee case the Commission indicated
73 § II(g) (2). See also the new Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess., §§ 175, 176, i U. S. C. A. §§ 575, 576 (Supp. 1938).
74 Genesee Valley Gas Company, Inc., Holding Company Act Release No. 981,
January 24, 1938; West Ohio Gas Company, Holding Company Act Release
No. 1284, October 22, 1938.
75 Holding Company Act Release No. 981, January 24, 1938, (1938) 38 CoL.
L. REv. 68o.
76 Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (I9M3). For discussion of the
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a preference for this view. The focal point of the reorganization
was Pavilion Natural Gas Company, a single operating subsidiary
from which almost the entire income of the system was derived.
This company had been supporting a superstructure of three lay-
ers of holding companies and the plan contemplated no immediate
change in this respect. As to Genesee Natural Gas Company,
Pavilion's immediate holding company, the plan left the mortgage
bonds untouched and allocated thirty-seven thousand odd shares
of new stock among creditors and noteholders, with 739 shares
going to the old stock interests. Among the several grounds on
which the Commission opposed the plan was the finding that Gene-
see's earning power did not justify the new capitalization and par-
ticularly did not warrant any participation in the reorganization
by the old stock. In view of the almost negligible participation of
the old stock, the Commission's opinion on this point, even though
affected by the question of voting power, would seem to show a
tendency toward a policy of strict maintenance of priorities."
Although the field of voluntary reorganizations is not circum-
scribed by judicial precedents to the same extent as that of re-
organizations under court supervision,"5 there is some indication
in the Commission's opinions that the policy of strict priority will
play a part there as well. This policy apparently motivated Com-
missioner Healy's dissent in International Paper and Power Com-
pany,9 an opinion which may have greater significance in view of
subsequent developments in that case and the changed personnel
of the Commission.80 Analyzing the recapitalization plan, the
so-called strict and relative theories of priority, see Bonbright and Bergerman, Two
Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in Corporate Reorganization
(1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 127; F3NLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
(I937) c. VI; (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 68o (commenting specifically on the Genesee
case).
77 The question of voting power in this case is discussed at p. 250, infra.
78 There are some precedents. For example, the rule against wiping out by
charter amendment accumulated dividends protects the priority of preferred stock-
holders in a fashion similar to the doctrine of the Boyd case. Cf. Keller v. Wilson &
Co., igo AtI. I 5 (Del. 1936).
79 Holding Company Act Release No. 641, May 5, 1937, pp. 18-22.
80 This case has had a long and involved history. With some misgivings the
Commission took jurisdiction of the case on May 5, 1937. Chairman Landis, Com-
missioners Ross, Mathews and Douglas were in favor of taking jurisdiction; Com-
missioner Healy opposed it. At the same time Commissioner Healy also dissented
to the report on the plan and Commissioner Douglas indicated his dislike of certain
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Commissioner arrived at a valuation both from the standpoint of
book value and earnings which, in his judgment, made two of the
three classes of common stock worth less than nothing. Though
in this dissent there is no reference to precedent in determining
fairness, it is interesting to note a theory developing which re-
sembles the doctrine of the Boyd case. It is especially interesting
in the area of recapitalizations where the bargain, as here, is
usually between two classes of stock, rather than between creditors
and stockholders. Yet if priority is to be given creditors and in
view of the Commission's tendency to insure that preference fea-
tures and voting rights of preferred stocks are not illusory, it
would not be surprising for the Commission to protect preferred
stocks in recapitalizations and in reorganizations where any equity
remains for stock interests. But at the same time it is to be
expected that the Commission will not permit this policy to
grow to such a proportion in voluntary reorganizations that it will
interfere with its program of simplification of corporate struc-
tures.
The apparent strictness of the Commission policy indicated
above has been tempered in United Telephone and Electric Com-
pany,"1 and to a lesser extent in West Ohio Gas Company.8 In
fact, in the former its relative indifference to the distribution of a
small amount of common shares to old stockholders raises some
doubt of consistency with the Genesee case. United Telephone
features. On August 3, 1937 (date of release), the Commission exempted the se-
curities to be issued pursuant to the plan, Chairman Landis and Commissioner
Mathews voting for the exemption, Commissioner Douglas against it. Holding
Company Act Release No. 770.
In September, 1937, a common stockholder named Lawless applied to the Com-
mission for a rehearing. On October 13, 1937, the Commission, acting through
Chairman Douglas and Commissioners Mathews and Healy, denied the application.
At that time Mr. Landis was no longer a member of the Commission and Commis-
sioner Ross had not heard the argument on the application. Holding Company Act
Release No. 85o. In this opinion it was indicated that if the case had been up for
the first time, the exemption would not have been granted.
The final chapter in the case remains to be written. On September 11, 1937, Law-
less filed a petition for review of the Commission's order of August 3, 1937 (re-
lease date), with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The fact that this attack came from a common stockholder would at least indicate
the wide range of controversy with respect to the fairness of the plan.
81 Holding Company Act Release No. i187, August 5, 1938.
82 Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, October 22, 1938.
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and Electric Company involved a reorganization plan under for-
mer Section 77B. In passing on the question of participation
of the old common stockholders the Commission noted that even
on the basis of valuation claimed by the reorganization managers,
the new securities issued to the holders of the preferred shares did
not equal the amount of claims upon them. The prospective earn-
ings of the new company also fell far short of the requirements for
dividends on the old preferred. However, the Commission con-
cluded that "the relatively insignificant portion of the equity
allocated to the common," 2.82 per cent, did not appear to infringe
"unfairly upon the contract rights and priorities of any class of
stockholders or creditors," and approved the plan.
There are several bases for distinguishing the United Telephone
case from the Genesee case. In the first place the parties who
suffered any loss of priority were preferred stockholders rather
than creditor claimants. Secondly, the Commission noted that a
substantial amount of common stock was held by operating em-
ployees of the company's subsidiaries whose participation in the
plan would create an element of good will which might be of im-
portance to the senior security holders. But the fundamental dis-
tinction between the two appears to be control, an element which
has assumed major significance in the Commission's considera-
tion of reorganization plans. It is an interesting speculation
whether in the Genesee case the Commission would have adopted a
policy of strict priority if the distribution of shares had not affected
control of the newly reorganized company. Out of some thirty-
seven thousand shares, only 739 were to go to old stockholders, an
amount smaller upon a percentage basis than the 2.82 per cent
which the Commission deemed a "relatively insignificant portion
of the equity" in United Telephone. But in the Genesee case, on
the basis of the exchange proposed in the plan, 51.4 per cent of
the voting control would be in the hands of the present manage-
ment and 48.6 per cent with the public; so that 739 shares, repre-
senting roughly 2 per cent of the stock, would theoretically be able
to swing control either way.
In West Ohio Gas Company,"3 involving reorganization of an
operating company under former Section 77B, the old bondholders
were to receive under the plan half of the principal amount of
83 Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, October 22, 1938.
[V01. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Harv. L. Rev. 250 1938-1939
1938] PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT 25,
their old bonds in new bonds and over go per cent of the new com-
mon stock. The parent of the bankrupt, by virtue of its owner-
ship of certain notes and 52 per cent of the old preferred stock,
was to receive over 8 per cent of the new common stock and the
balance went to other holders of the old preferred. The old com-
mon stock was wiped out entirely by the plan. Once again the
evidence pointed to the conclusion that the bankrupt's property
had little, if any, value in excess of the claims of the old bond-
holders, thereby raising the question of the propriety of partici-
pation by junior creditors and stockholders. Here again, as in
United Telephone and Electric Company, the Commission declared
that" the relatively small participation by the unsecured creditors
and preferred stockholders" did not amount to such a substan-
tial diversion of interests belonging to the bondholders as to re-
quire a finding that the plan was unfair. Even though the value of
the property in this case was affected by certain contingencies as to
future earnings which are not to be found in the ordinary case,",
the decision definitely points to the conclusion that the Boyd case
doctrine will be applied reasonably rather than strictly.
West Ohio Gas Company has additional significance in another
respect. The Commission placed itself on record on the question
of whether under the Boyd case doctrine priorities must be so main-
tained that the same grade of new securities cannot be offered to
security holders of different rank. Following the United States
Supreme Court,85 the Commission held that a variation in amount
of the new securities, even though of the same grade, was a suffi-
cient recognition of priorities, and permitted the noteholder and
the preferred stockholders to share in the common stock with the
old bondholders. 6 That such a result is necessary on sheer grounds
of policy seems apparent, for otherwise the objective of the Act to
simplify corporate structures and securities would be rendered
wholly unrealizable.
The importance of control as an element in determining fairness
84 These contingencies included an upturn in business attributable to an aggres-
sive merchandising campaign and an effort to improve public relations. See Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 1284, October 22, 1938, p. 6.
85 See Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 27I U. S. 445
(1926).
88 Commissioner Healy, while concurring in result, did not concur in the
majority's application of this case.
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arose again in American Gas and Power Company.7  Although
some courts have expressed concern as to control of newly re-
organized companies, there has been no clear-cut recognition that
the history of a management in the past was a fair criterion of its
performance in the future. The plan for Birmingham Gas Com-
pany was proposed jointly with its parent, American Gas and
Power Company. By reason of the additional cash consideration
tendered by the parent, and the lack of information with respect
to the valuation of Birmingham's property, it is impossible to ar-
rive at any satisfactory conclusion as to the fairness of the distri-
bution of securities under the plan. However, examination of
87 Holding Company Act Release No. 1256, September 30, 1938. The recapitali-
zation plan of Birmingham Gas Company came before the Commission as part of a
joint application by it and its parent, American Gas and Power Company, under
§§ ii(g), 12(c) and 7 of the Act. The background of the recapitalization and the
terms of the plan are extremely complicated but are necessary to an understanding
of the case.
Reduced to a bare minimum, the difficulties mainly revolved around an obliga-
tion of American to Birmingham for $I,io5,00o, created in 1932. Under the pro-
posed plan Birmingham was to cancel this obligation in return for $55oooo in cash,
the cancellation of a note of Birmingham held by American for $4o5,ooo, and the
return to Birmingham of 6o,ooo shares of its common stock held by American.
American was to retain its controlling interest in Birmingham's common stock. If
the obligation of $i,ios,ooo of American had been of standard character, the plan
would have been discriminatory against Birmingham, even without reference to
American's retention of Birmingham's common stock (which might be wiped out
had the companies been forced into a bankruptcy reorganization). However, the
obligation was not of standard character. It arose in 1932 out of an investigation
by the Alabama Public Service Commission of intercompany transactions between
American and Birmingham. At that time the Alabama Commission fixed the in-
debtedness of American to Birmingham at $x,iogooo, which American agreed to pay
pro rata with other unsecured debt out of earnings in excess of operating expenses
and fixed charges. No definite maturity for the note was prescribed.
In 1935 American was reorganized under former § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
under a plan that gave substantial participation to old stockholders of American
despite diminution of claims of Birmingham and other subsidiaries, which at that
time were creditors of American. Their consents to the plan were filed by counsel
for American rather than through independent representatives, and the $1,105,000
obligation was converted into a form of income note without maturity. Payments
of interest and principal on the note were limited to a certain fraction of the net
earnings of American as computed in a formula set forth in the plan. This formula,
as construed by counsel for American, was of such a nature that by continued bank
borrowing and repayment, distribution to Birmingham under the formula could be
avoided. This construction was reached on the theory that repayments of such
bank loans were "interest and sinking fund installments" which constituted a
deduction before computing "available net earnings."
However, the Commission found Birmingham's recapitalization plan "was nok
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earlier financial transactions between the two companies by the
Commission disclosed a "long record of spoliation" of Birming-
ham by its parent. This was regarded by the Commission as
justifiable reason for imposing conditions upon the consummation
of the plan.
So far as fairness of plans is concerned, the opinion indicates
two tendencies of the Commission. First, while it recognizes that
nothing is to be done about the past per se, nevertheless it will
make extensive use of the record of a company to correct what it
deems earlier injustices to the extent it reasonably can do so in
the particular case. Secondly, the case indicates that by imposing
terms and conditions the Commission may substantially modify
plans of reorganization without assuming the status of a proponent
of a plan. In addition the case raises an interesting question of
Commission procedure in passing upon voluntary plans. As in
International Paper and Power Company, also involving a volun-
tary recapitalization,88 the Commission was not certain in its own
mind as to the fairness of the plan, but nevertheless found it "not
so unfair" that it felt it would not be justified in denying the
security holders an opportunity to vote upon the plan. Whether
or not the Commission will ever adopt the same policy in judicial
reorganizations where Section ii (f) expressly requires it to ap-
prove the plan of reorganization still remains undetermined.
To complete the process of insulation from the dominance of a
single group, such as management, solicitations are required to
conform with such rules and regulations as the Commission may
so unfair that the declarations under Section 7(d) may not be permitted to become
effective." But certain conditions were imposed, the most important of which
roughly are as follows: (i) No deduction of interest and amortization payments on
American's bank loans could be made under the formula without express consent of
the parties affected, and failing such consent a prior deduction of $zoo,ooo was to be
restored to available net earnings. (2) The plan must be approved by large per-
centages of the parties affected, varying from 661% in the case of American's secured
debentures to 95% in the case of Birmingham's preferred stock. This approval must
be after such security holders received the report of the Commission on the plan
and all solicitation literature had been passed upon by the Commission. (3) Bir-
mingham and other subsidiaries in a like situation should retain independent coun-
sel to advise them with respect to intercompany transactions. (4) The Commission
should retain continuous jurisdiction with respect to fees and expenses paid in con-
nection with the plan, and to the application of funds by American until its bank
loan is repaid.
88 See p. 245, supra.
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deem necessary. Pursuant to its authority under Sections i i (g)
(3) and i2 (e), the Commission has issued certain rules which, in
addition to providing the investor with adequate information con-
cerning his solicitor and the expenses involved, drastically alter
the scope of authority of those soliciting and tend to impose upon
them fiduciary responsibilities. 9
The effect of these rules is well illustrated in the recent release
In the Matter of John A. Dawson90 where certain individuals
sought permission to act as a protective committee and to solicit
the deposit of bonds in the reorganization under former Section
77B of a subsidiary of Utilities Power & Light Corporation. The
deposit agreement, pursuant to which solicitations were to be
sought, contained many provisions which proved to be directly
contrary to the Commission's standards. Under it a depositing
bondholder surrendered all vestige of control over his bonds and
virtually gave the committee a " blank check " to act as it pleased.
The privilege of withdrawal from the agreement was extremely
limited, being conditioned on a bondholder's paying his pro rata
share of the expenses of the committee as determined by the com-
mittee. The committee was to have power to trade in deposit
certificates and in securities of the company, and at the same time
was exonerated from all liability except for gross negligence or
wilful default.
All these provisions were severely condemned by the Commis-
sion in its opinion refusing to permit the committee to act, for they
were in direct contravention of the rules which had been issued
under Section 12 (e). The " blank check" clause ran counter to
the established policy of the Act of offering each security holder
adequate information and opportunity to exercise his own judg-
ment as to whether to accept or dissent from the plan.9 The re-
stricted privilege of withdrawal directly violated Rule U-12E-3
requiring provision for an unconditional right of withdrawal at
any time before the authorization was conclusively exercised.2
89 Rules U-12E-I, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, General Rules and Regulations under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of I935, as amended to and including July x,
1938.
90 Holding Company Act Release No. 12oo, August 18, 1938.
91 § ii(g). See also the new Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. §§ 175, i76, i U. S. C. A. §§ 575, 576 (Supp. 1938).
92 It should be noted that Rule U-12E-3(c), (d) of the General Rules and
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Moreover, since the committee was undertaking to act in a fidu-
ciary capacity, the power to determine its own expense, to trade in
deposit certificates and in securities of the company, and the ex-
oneration from liability were considered thoroughly inconsistent
with the proper responsibilities of a trustee.3 Consequently, the
Commission found the deposit agreement failed to measure up to
the desired standard of fiduciary duty.
Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Trustees. In the so-called
Barkley Bill " introduced in the recent Congress, extensive
changes were contemplated in the position of the corporate trus-
tee. The general policy is to make trustees under indentures truly
trustees with fiduciary responsibilities toward the security hold-
ers rather than mere "stakeholders." That this same policy will
be carried out under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
wherever possible is a foregone conclusion, for such a policy is
directly in line with the program of encouraging independent rep-
resentation of each class of security holders under all circum-
stances. A striking example of this policy is found in Kansas
Electric Power Company.5 The declarant was seeking approval
of the issuance of $5,000,000 of first mortgage bonds, secured by
an indenture to a corporate trustee which at that time was the
largest single stockholder of the company's parent. This gave
rise to an obvious conflict of interest on the part of the corporate
trustee. However, the declaration was permitted to become effec-
tive by a divided vote of the Commission. Both the majority and
the dissent were agreed as a matter of principle that independence
of the corporate trustee was essential not only at time of default
when it would have to act to protect the bondholders, but also at
Regulations under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, distinguishes
sharply between a solicitation of restricted authorizations or proxies merely to repre-
sent security holders in negotiating a reorganization plan and a solicitation of con-
sents or dissents to a plan. Every restricted authorization must expressly state it
does not constitute a consent or dissent, while every solicitation of consents or dis-
sents must be preceded or accompanied by a copy of a report made by the Commis-
sion, together with adequate disclosure of the interests and compensation of the
soliciting parties.
9s See SEC REPORT ON PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION Conmr"EEs (May io,
1937) pt. I, pp. 888-96.
0' S. 2344, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
05 x S. E. C. 891 (1936), Holding Company Act Release No. 486, December i9,
1936, (i937) 46 YALE L. J. zo58. The case is also discussed at p. 238, supra.
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the time the trust indenture was drafted. But the majority felt
that since the stock ownership of the corporate trustee was tem-
porary in nature and since to compel the renegotiation of the
issue and selection of a new corporate trustee would result in un-
necessary expense to the issuer, no adverse action should be taken.
Commissioners Healy and Douglas dissented saying: "The oppor-
tunity for negotiation with an eye single to the interests of the
bondholders has passed." " Nowhere, however, does the dissent
point out any particular provisions in the indenture that should not
have been there nor the omission of any provisions which should
have been included."
Admittedly the factual situation above was a novel one and is
not likely to reoccur. But since the division of opinion was largely
on a question of expediency in the light of circumstances of a par-
ticular case, the opinion may be regarded as an accurate statement
of the policy of the Commission to require wholly independent
corporate trustees who at the time of negotiation of trust inden-
tures will act to secure the most protection for their security
holders.
Another aspect of the problem of conflict of interest in corporate
trustees arose very recently in Indiana General Service Com-
pany." An operating company, organized in Indiana, proposed to
issue first mortgage bonds with the Guaranty Trust Company of
New York as trustee under the indenture. The issuance had been
authorized by the Public Service Commission of Indiana and since
it was for the purpose of financing its business as a public utility
company, the issuer sought exemption under Section 6(b) from
filing a declaration under Section 7. The Guaranty Trust Com-
pany, however, was already trustee of a debenture issue of the
applicant's parent company. The Commission's opinion states
that the Guaranty Trust Company represented that it would re-
sign within sixty days as trustee of the proposed issue unless the
Commission found that no substantial conflict of interest existed.
96 1 S. E. C. 891, 899 (1936), Iolding Company Act Release No. 486, December
14, 1937, at p. 7.
97 Immediately after approval of the declaration, the corporate trustee resigned as
trustee under the indenture securing the bonds involved in the declaration, and
also as corporate trustee under two other indentures where it was in the same
position.
98 Holding Company Act Release No. 1261, October 5, 1938.
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While no condition in this regard was attached to the order grant-
ing the exemption, the inference is that this representation was
required by the Commission before the order was granted. If the
Commission adopts the policy of forbidding the same trust com-
pany to act as corporate trustee under more than one indenture of
companies occupying a relation of parent and subsidiary, this
policy, while perhaps consistent with the objective of the Barkley
Bill, will go farther than the provisions of any draft of that bill
proposed to date.
CONCLUSION
Appraising the work of the Commission as a whole, it is clear
that though the "death sentence" provisions of Section i I over-
shadow all others in the public eye, no policy has yet been defined
with respect to simplification and integration of holding company
systems beyond recognizing the essentially evolutionary character
of the process. But in passing on applications in regard to se-
curity issues and plans of reorganization, certain standards for
public utility finance and management have been imposed. To
many practicing lawyers and financial advisers this aspect of the
Commission's work is of paramount interest.
To such persons one important question is whether in imposing
standards the Commission has pursued a moderate course or gone
to the extreme limits made possible by the broad language of the
Act. From what has been said heretofore it should be apparent
that in most instances the Commission has adopted a policy of
moderation. The standards it has applied for the most part are
not new standards of its own creation but standards which had
been recognized as good corporate practice prior to passage of the
Act. The essential difference today is that imposition of these
standards by the Commission to all companies and persons sub-
ject to its jurisdiction has greatly expanded their field of applica-
tion and in so doing has raised the general level of corporate
practice.
A second question of like nature is whether in imposing these
standards the Commission has been able to make them flexible
rather than rigid. Like any other administrative body, the Com-
mission might have tended to " freeze" its practice within narrow
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boundaries. Fortunately, it has recognized its role as an admin-
istrative body and not a court, and the dangers of inelasticity have
largely been avoided. There has been no dogmatic prohibition
of voting trusts and no-par stock, no rigorous requirement of com-
petitive bidding upon the sale of new issues nor of absolute pri-
ority among classes on reorganization. Since the possibility of
harm from devices of this type lies solely in the way they are
used, the Commission has realized that its continuing jurisdiction
over utility companies, enabling it to deal with each problem on
its own facts, will afford adequate protection. But in some in-
stances the Commission has found it desirable to set up less flex-
ible standards. Where the greatest possibility of abuse exists at
the inception of a transaction, as with the initial distribution of
voting power, adherence to more stringent standards has been
required. But on the whole the elasticity of Commission policy
has been a marked characteristic of its administration of the Act.
At the same time the Commission has made clear in every case its
unwillingness to compromise its final objectives of simplifying
corporate structures and securities and of eliminating profits
arising from failure to recognize fiduciary responsibilities.
John F. Meck.
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